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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS BONDS REDEEMABLE AT OPTION OF
MUNICIPALITY- NOTICE TO BONDHOLDERS NECESSARY TO STOP RUNNING
OF INTEREST - Defendant municipality issued bonds redeemable before maturity at defendant's option. There was no provision for registration, and neither
the statute nor the bonds provided for notice of redemption. In May, I 938,
notice was published in newspapers of general circulation that the bonds were to
be redeemed on June I. Plaintiff, owner of the entire issue, did not know of
the redemption until September 2 7. It sued for interest from June I to September 2 7. Held, notice by publication is sufficient to stop the running of interest,
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and plaintiff is therefore not entitled to recover. Philadelphia Savings Fund
Society v. City of Bethlehem, 143 Pa. Super. 449, 17 A. (2d)' 750 (1941).
The notice of redemption necessary to stop the running of interest on
municipal bonds redeemable before maturity at the option of the municipality is
usually provided for in a general statute, in the special enabling act authorizing
the bond issue, or in the bonds themselv.es. But a few cases in which there was
no such provision have reached the appellate courts. It has been said that the
weight of authority favors the view that the bondholder must have actual notice,1
but the division appears to be about even, 2 all the recent cases holding that
notice by publication is sufficient.3 In Hinds County v. National Life Insurance
Co.,4 the leading case for the older view, the court proceeded on the theory
that the lack of any provision is the fault of the legislature and the municipality,
for which the latter should suffer rather than its creditors, and that the credit
of the municipality should not be impaired by a refusal to pay the interest demanded. The court then drew an analogy to the rule requiring the maker of
a promissory note who has an option to pay before maturity to give notice to
the holder before he can stop the running of interest. There were in the case, however, only a few bondholders, who were mostly local~residents. On that basis
the case was distinguished from Stewart v. Henry C aunty, 5 the leading case for
the more recent view and the primary authority for the holding in the principal case. The latter view is based on expediency: since the municipality cannot
know who the bondholders are, personal notice to .each is an unreasonable, if not
impossible, requirement. 6 Such an approach is far more realistic, especially when,
as in the Stewart case, the bondholder has relatively easy means of keeping in
communication with the municipality or its agent. One court seems to have
struck a reasonable compromise in requiring notice by publication, notice to the
paying agent, and actual notice to all bondholders known to the municipality.7
To require more seems unduly burdensome. If there are circumstances which
render the position of the bondholder peculiarly favorable or the conduct of
the municipality unreasonably neglectful of the bondholder's rights, the court
may exercise some discretion in varying the rule in the bondholder's favor. 8
1 30 AM. JuR. 43 (1940); 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) u46 (1913).
2
The writer has found four American cases on each side of the question, in addition to the principal case. Those requiring actual notice: Keith v. New Orleans, IO
La. Ann. 423 (1855); Read v. Buffalo, 74 N. Y. 463 (1878); Berkey v. Board of
Commissioners of Pueblo County, 48 Colo. 104, IIO P. 197 (1910); Hinds County
v. National Life Ins. Co., 104 Miss. 104, 61 So. 164 (1913). Those allowing constructive notice: Stewart v. Henry County, (C. C. Mo. 1895) 66 F. 127; State v.
Tallahassee, 126 Fla. 275, 170 So. 897 (1936); Spartanburg v. Leonard, 180 S. C.
491, 186 S. E. 395 (1936); Catholic Order of Foresters v. State, 67 N. D. 228,
271 N. W. 670 (1937). The last case cited appears to be the only one involving bonds
of a private corporation.
3
See note 2, supra.
4
104 Miss. 104, 61 So. 164 (1913).
5
(C. C. Mo. 1895) 66 F. 127.
6
Annotation, 109 A. L. R. 988 at 999 (1937).
1
Spartanburg v. Leonard, 180 S. C. 491, 186 S. E. 395 (1936).
8
Some of the cases place much emphasis on the fact situation and may be reconciled with the others on that basis. See especially Hinds County v. National Life Ins.
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But it is advantageous to the municipality to be certain of its rights. The principal case illustrates a tendency to be liberal with the municipality. Since the
factors in the bondholder's favor were as strong as in any case,9 the court's
liberality was perhaps too extreme, but certainly the holding is predicated on a
general approach that is both realistic and reasonable.

Co., 104 Miss. 104, 61 So. 164 (1913); Stewart v. Henry County, (C. C. Mo.
189.5) 66 F. 127.
9 The notice here was published only once, and that less than thirty days before
the redemption date. Since plaintiff was the sole bondholder, no bonds were redeemed
on that date, which fact might have put the defendant on inquiry as to the effectiveness of its notice. Furthermore, plaintiff had frequently written to defendant to discover whether the bonds had been called, thus giving defendant notice that plaintiff
was a bondholder and interested in the possibility of redemption. It was only in a
reply to the last of these communications that plaintiff first received notice of the
redemption.

